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FOREWORD
Whereas the role of the federal military is clearly
defined and limited in the spectrum of domestic operations, the National Guard, as a state or federal asset depending on duty status designation, assumes
a more dynamic, multi-spectrum support role. This
multi-spectrum role sometimes puts the Guard at
the center of a contentious command power struggle
between the states and federal government; a power
struggle that has led to a growing debate over the role
of the National Guard during domestic operations,
with some questioning whether the Guard is better aligned to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), rather than the states, for domestic operational
requirements.
This monograph, by Dr. Ryan Burke and Dr. Sue
McNeil, attempts to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of a hypothetical realignment of the National
Guard to the DHS. Drawing from interviews with a
range of subject matter experts primarily from the
National Guard and the DHS, Burke and McNeil first
address the pros and cons of such a shift as suggested
by their interview subjects. Using the highlighted issues as a basis for their argument, they conclude with
five recommendations aimed at improving the utility
and contribution of the National Guard during future
domestic operations.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) designates homeland defense (HD) as one of the three core
pillars of the nation’s current and future defense strategy.1 Defending the homeland from external threats
and aggression requires a robust military capability.
In this sense, both the federal Armed Forces (active
and reserve components), as well as state National
Guard forces play important roles in the defense of the
nation. Further, HD often overlaps with civil support
(CS) and homeland security to form a triad of domestic military operational domains. Where the roles, responsibilities, and limitations of the active and reserve
components of the Armed Forces are relatively clear
in this triad, the National Guard is a unique military
entity capable of serving in either a state-controlled
or federally controlled status during domestic operations. Whether the Guard operates in a state-funded,
state-controlled status (State Active Duty [SAD]); a
federally funded, state-controlled status (Title 32); or
a federally funded and controlled status (Title 10) is a
topic of ongoing debate during CS missions. Regardless of their duty status in such situations, the National Guard contributes to the security, protection, and
well-being of the population. As such, it is important
to continually assess the roles, responsibilities, and
organizational orientation of the National Guard during domestic operations in support of civil authorities, and to ensure the states and federal government
maximize the utility of this unique military capability
when it matters most.
As part of the ongoing effort to improve domestic
mission capabilities in support of civil authorities, the
Department of Defense (DoD) continually evaluates
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new and different approaches to achieving enhanced
civil-military coordination. In this context, the unique
position of the Guard as either a state or federal military force—depending on duty status designation—
brings added complexity to the already difficult task
of ensuring a well-coordinated state and federal military response effort. As such, there has been continued
debate over whether the National Guard—or specific
elements thereof—should serve in a permanent federal capacity to better support the nation’s security and
disaster response mission. As a result of that ongoing
discussion, the 2014-2015 Army War College’s Key
Strategic Issues List (KSIL) asks: “what would be the
benefits and drawbacks of realigning the [National]
Guard under the [Department] of Homeland Security
to enhance domestic security and disaster response,
while retaining utility for overseas missions in support of the Department of Defense?”2
This monograph details our efforts to research and
evaluate the perceived benefits and drawbacks of realigning the National Guard under the DHS, as per
the KSIL topic noted above. We begin with a brief review of the relevant literature shaping the current policy and doctrinal approach to military CS operations,
including a summary of laws and strategic guidance
relevant to the discussion. We then note the important distinctions between homeland security (HS) and
HD and the military role in each context. The seam
between HS and HD provides a conceptual basis for
discussing the roles and responsibilities of the National Guard, the DHS, and the DoD within domestic
security and disaster response operations. After evaluating the National Guard’s role in each of the above
contexts, we briefly discuss the realignment of the
United States Coast Guard (USCG) within the DHS
as a proxy for comparison of a similar realignment of
xii

a military-style entity under the DHS. Then, drawing
from interviews with relevant subject matter experts,
we present several potential benefits and drawbacks
of a Guard realignment to the DHS as noted by those
interviewed for this monograph. Interview subjects
represented a broad range of backgrounds, including
officers from both the Army and Air National Guard;
the Maryland and Delaware state emergency management agencies; active and retired U.S. Coast Guard
officers; the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA); U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM);
current and former senior DoD officials with experience in homeland defense and CS operations; as well
as representatives from academia with specific interests in military-involved state and federal operations.
The study concludes with five short recommendations
in summary of the research effort.
ENDNOTES - SUMMARY
1. Chuck Hagel, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 4, 2014, p. V.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Part I: Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis, 2014-2015 Key Strategic Issues List, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press, June 2014, p. 10.
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INVESTIGATING THE BENEFITS
AND DRAWBACKS OF REALIGNING
THE NATIONAL GUARD UNDER
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) designates homeland defense (HD) as one of the three core
pillars of the nation’s current and future defense strategy.1 Defending the homeland from external threats
and aggression requires a robust military capability.
In this sense, both the federal Armed Forces (active
and reserve components), as well as state National
Guard forces play important roles in the defense of
the nation. Further, HD often overlaps with civil support (CS) and homeland security (HS) to form a triad
of domestic military operational domains. Where
the roles, responsibilities, and limitations of the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces are
relatively clear in this triad, the National Guard is a
unique military entity capable of serving in either a
state-controlled or federally controlled status during
domestic operations. Whether the National Guard
operates in a state-funded, state-controlled status
(State Active Duty [SAD]); a federally funded, statecontrolled status (Title 32); or a federally funded and
controlled status (Title 10) is a topic of ongoing debate
during CS missions. Regardless of their duty status
in such situations, the National Guard contributes to
the security, protection, and well-being of the population. As such, it is important to continually assess the
roles, responsibilities, and organizational orientation
of the National Guard during domestic operations in
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support of civil authorities, and to ensure the states
and federal government maximize the utility of this
unique military capability when it matters most.
As part of the ongoing effort to improve domestic mission capabilities in support of civil authorities,
the Department of Defense (DoD) continually evaluates new and different approaches to achieving enhanced civil-military coordination. In this context, the
unique position of the National Guard as either a state
or federal military force—depending on duty status
designation—brings added complexity to the already
difficult task of ensuring a well-coordinated state and
federal military response effort. As such, there has
been continued debate over whether the National
Guard—or specific elements thereof—should serve
in a permanent federal capacity to better support the
nation’s security and disaster response mission. As a
result of the ongoing discussion, the 2014-2015 Army
War College’s Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) asks:
what would be the benefits and drawbacks of realigning the [National] Guard under the [Department] of
Homeland Security to enhance domestic security and
disaster response, while retaining utility for overseas
missions in support of the Department of Defense?2

SUMMARY OF MONOGRAPH AND
METHODOLOGY
This monograph details our efforts to research and
evaluate the potential benefits and drawbacks of realigning the National Guard under the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), as per the KSIL topic noted
above. We begin with a brief review of the relevant
literature shaping the current policy and doctrinal
approach to military CS operations, including a sum2

mary of laws and strategic guidance relevant to the
discussion. We then note the important distinctions
between HS and HD, and the military role in each
context. The seam between HS and HD provides a
conceptual basis for discussing the roles and responsibilities of the National Guard, the DHS, and the DoD
within domestic security and disaster response operations. After evaluating the National Guard’s role
in each of the above contexts, we briefly discuss the
realignment of the United States Coast Guard (USCG)
within the DHS as a proxy for comparison of a similar
realignment of a military-style entity under the DHS.
The study concludes by listing and discussing the potential benefits and drawbacks of a National Guard
realignment under the DHS and then makes five short
recommendations in summary of the research effort.
In researching this monograph, we used a qualitative approach to data collection, combining semistructured personal interviews with extensive document analysis. We requested interviews with subjects
representing state and/or federal interests relevant to
the research topic. After solicitation and coordination,
we conducted individual interviews with personnel
representing a range of both state and federal backgrounds. Personnel interviewed during the data collection phase of this research include representatives
from the Army and Air National Guard (ranks ranging from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general); the
Maryland and Delaware state emergency management
agencies; current and retired USCG officers (ranks
ranging from commander to [four-star] admiral); the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Additionally, current and former senior DoD officials with
experience in HD and CS operations, as well as rep-
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resentatives from academia with specific interests in
military-involved state and federal operations were
interviewed. In total, we performed 21.5 hours of interviews and developed over 100 pages of interview
notations for coding and analysis.
Based on the subjects’ backgrounds, interviews focused on identifying both the potential benefits and
drawbacks of a National Guard realignment under
the DHS to support disaster response and domestic
security missions. We coded interview data using an
initial open coding scheme to label responses and suggestions. After open coding of all interview data, we
used a descriptive coding scheme to develop specific
code frames, grouping repeated assessments and recommendations into similar categories for further analysis. Once our code frames were developed, we used
this data to identify the most significant perceived
benefits and drawbacks of such a realignment as well
as any recommendations that could be inferred as a
result. Lastly, we reviewed over 1,000 pages of reports, policies, laws, studies, scholarly literature, and
other relevant material to help shape our discussion
and analysis. While the interview discussions and
resulting drawbacks, benefits, and recommendations
emphasized purely hypothetical scenarios given the
above KSIL question, our subjects’ collective backgrounds, knowledge, and experience provided a substantial basis of relevant information that facilitated a
thorough analysis of the topic. This monograph presents a summary of our data collection and analysis
efforts.
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HISTORY AND CONTEXT
Military forces—both state and federal—have long
been involved in supporting civil authorities in varying capacities and support roles. From Hurricane Andrew and the Los Angeles riots of 1992, to Hurricane
Sandy and the pre-election political conventions of
2012, we have seen military forces involved in some
of the most high-profile domestic security and/or
disaster response missions in recent memory. In incidents of large magnitude involving complex or cascading failures to our physical and social infrastructure, military forces sometimes provide the necessary
capability to meet and overcome these challenges—all
while saving lives, preventing suffering, mitigating
property damage3, and restoring our way of life. In
incidents of massive proportion like Hurricane Katrina, we sometimes see state National Guard troops
operating alongside federal military troops from the
active and reserve components. Even with the recent
adoption of the dual status commander (DSC) concept
as a mechanism to improve coordination between the
states and federal government4, the National Guard
and federal military serve under distinctly different
command structures during most domestic missions.
As a result, this limits effective coordination between
the National Guard and federal military during domestic operations; something that has continued to be
present as a documented challenge in most combined
state-federal missions, the most notable of which being
Katrina. Given the National Guard’s unique position
and ability to perform roles within homeland defense,
homeland security, and CS contexts—in either state
or federal status—the states and federal government
continue to debate the role of the National Guard in
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domestic response and security missions well into the
post-Katrina era.
Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001,
President Bush—through the Homeland Security Act
of 2002—directed the establishment of the DHS as the
primary federal agency responsible for protecting the
United States. Concurrently, the Bush Administration directed the establishment of NORTHCOM as a
geographic combatant command with homeland defense and CS as its primary mission priorities. The creation of the DHS and NORTHCOM demonstrated the
growing commitment to homeland defense and security as a national priority. As such, there is a wealth of
national-level policy guidance outlining the roles and
responsibilities of relevant federal agencies and stakeholders. More specifically, however, is the distinction
between HD, HS, and CS in terms of domestic military
operations.
Among the standing guidance influencing domestic military strategy, many documents advocate
for a coordinated approach to defense, security, and
CS. Documents like the 2010 National Security Strategy, Presidential Policy Directive 8, various Homeland
Security Presidential Directives, the National Military
Strategy of the United States of America, and the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review all call for the need to
strengthen and maintain interagency partnerships
as well as stakeholder engagement and cooperation.5
These documents also affirm that in the context of
homeland defense and security, the protection of the
American people is paramount. According to the National Security Strategy, “this Administration has no
greater responsibility than the safety and security of
the American people.”6 To meet this responsibility,
there is a national expectation that federal agencies
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will establish necessary coordination mechanisms and
interagency relationships designed to facilitate enhanced security and/or response operations. Creating
and maintaining the required relationships requires
clear and distinct guidance concerning the various
roles and responsibilities of federal agencies during
homeland defense, homeland security, and CS operations. With regard to the military role, these distinctions are significant and need to be examined.
Homeland Defense, Security, and Civil
Support Spectrum.
The DoD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint
Operating Concept (JOC) was published by NORTHCOM in 2007 and discussed how the DoD fulfills its
role in supporting and defending the nation during
domestic operations when required.7 The 2013 version of DoD Joint Publication 3-27: Homeland Defense
expands on this and discusses the particular variations and relationships between HD, HS, and defense
support of civil authorities (DSCA), or CS.8 In addition
to discussing how the DoD plans to detect, deter, prevent, and if necessary, defeat external threats and aggression, these documents provide the framework for
military action during domestic operations intersecting between HD, HS, and DSCA/CS. In this context,
there are important distinctions between HD, HS, and
CS. The JOC pulls from other national guidance documents and defines each as follows:
Homeland Defense (HD): The protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical
defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.
[The DoD is responsible for HD.]
7

Homeland Security (HS): A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize
the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.
Civil Support (CS): DoD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law
enforcement and other activities.9

These are important distinctions for determining
the roles and responsibilities of our various military
and government capabilities during domestic missions
meeting the above criteria. The JOC further clarifies
that while the DoD is the lead federal agency (LFA)
for HD operations, it operates strictly in a support role
for both HS and CS (Figure 1). In contrast, non-federalized National Guard forces (Title 32 or SAD) can provide an often-needed military capability to state and
federal authorities during HS and CS missions. The
National Guard is trained and equipped by the DoD
and, unless federalized under Title 10 authority, is “responsive to state sovereign authorities free of many of
the limitations that constrain federal forces.”10 In the
context of our national military capabilities, therefore,
the National Guard is a key security and response
resource for the states and federal government alike.
However, the National Guard’s current arrangement
in national response and security doctrine places it in
a debated position within a web of laws, policies, financial concerns, politics, and the founding principles
of the nation. These many guiding parameters and restrictions only contribute to the friction between states
and the federal government during domestic response
and security situations. Therefore, it is important to
revisit some of the relevant details that contribute to
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the varying complexities associated with the National
Guard and its domestic missions.

Figure 1. The Roles of the Department of Defense
Regarding Homeland Defense, Security,
and Civil Support.
NATIONAL GUARD: ROLES AND MISSIONS
The United States Constitution guarantees individual states’ rights to form and maintain their own
militias.11 Over the years, the constitutionally referred
militia has since evolved from an obligated militia, to
an organized militia, to the National Guard we know
today.12 Whereas federal military forces serve at the
discretion of the President with the current legislative
structure in place, National Guard troops can serve in
three distinct duty statuses representing a combination of state and federal interests.
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The National Guard remains a state military asset
first. As a state asset, the National Guard provides an
established military capability to Governors during
security and/or response operations. When serving in
SAD status, the National Guard is under the command
and control of their state Governor.13 Governors serve
as the Commander-in-Chief of their state National
Guard forces and can deploy the National Guard—in
accordance with individual state constitutions and
other laws—to support operations within their state as
necessary (or in other states through emergency management assistance compact [EMAC] agreements). In
SAD, states are financially responsible for all National
Guard-related expenses. As a state military force, the
restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act14 do not apply
to National Guard forces in SAD status.
In Title 32 status, National Guard forces are called
into service at the request of the President or Secretary
of Defense “for training or other duty.”15 In Title 32
status, National Guard forces remain under the command and control of the Governor. However, because
the federal government requests—or retroactively
approves following a Governor’s request for funding—Guard deployment in support of civil authorities
under Title 32 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), financial responsibility for the employment of National
Guard forces rests with the federal government. Additionally, because National Guard troops remain under
the command of the Governor in Title 32 status, Posse
Comitatus does not apply. Whereas the Constitution
guarantees states the right to maintain a militia, Article II, Section 2 provides the authority for calling the
militia into federal service:
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The President shall be commander in chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several states, when called into the actual service of
the United States.16

When mobilized or federalized under Title 10 status, command, control, and expenses of the National
Guard are the responsibility of the federal government. The federal government primarily uses Title
10 authority to mobilize National Guard troops for
overseas contingency operations in support of the
DoD. However, if the President federalizes National
Guard forces under Title 10 authority to support domestic operations, Posse Comitatus takes effect as the
National Guard is considered a federal military force
in this situation. Moreover, while the President has
the ultimate legal authority to federalize the National
Guard without approval from the respective states’
Governor—abusing this power can have damaging
political consequences—and is therefore rarely directed.17 Table 1 summarizes the command, control, and
expenses of domestic National Guard duty statuses.
Duty Status

State Active Duty

Command Authority
Pay and Benefits

Governor
State

Posse Comitatus Act

Title 32

Title 10
President

Federal
N/A

Yes

Table 1. National Guard Duty Statuses.
Although there have been recent attempts through
legislative and policy action to improve the inherent
complexities of coordinating a combined National
Guard and federal military response,18 challenges
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remain. The DSC initiative—which authorizes a single
officer to command state and federal military forces
during domestic CS missions—is still relatively new
and requires further testing to improve its effectiveness as a command and control mechanism for emergency and disaster response.19 The DSC arrangement
has been used effectively during pre-planned domestic security and other special events since 2004.20
However, questions remain as to whether such a command arrangement is ideal for the complexities of nonotice/limited-notice incident response requirements.
Other military command and control options (Table 2)
present equally challenging operational environments
for domestic security and response, none of which
is mutually beneficial to both states and the federal
government.
Command Option

National Guard

State*
Parallel

Federal Military
Governor

Governor

President

Dual Status

Dual Status Commander (32 U.S.C. § 315/325)

Federal

President

* Conceptual model—While such a model has been proposed in past legislation,
currently there is no legal basis for the Governor of a state to assume direct command authority over federal military forces.

Table 2. Domestic Military Command Models.
While the DSC arrangement may prove to be the
best and most effective construct for commanding
a joint military response force at some point in the
future, we do not currently have a proven and reliable method of integrating the National Guard into
the federal response or security framework. As we
continue to see domestic security grow as a national

12

priority, and as we become more aware of the need
for robust domestic disaster response capabilities, the
ability to fully leverage the National Guard to support these requirements will be paramount. Due to
the increasing emphasis on HD, domestic security,
and disaster response, we need to continue to seek
alternative methods to improve our ability to protect
and defend our citizens using the full range of military capabilities. As such, calls to realign the National
Guard—or at least some elements thereof—have received increasing attention following major domestic
response efforts, such as those following hurricanes
Katrina and Sandy. To consider this fully, it is necessary to understand the basic roles and responsibilities
of the DHS, including its mission and organizational
hierarchy.
DHS: ROLES AND MISSIONS
The vision of the DHS is to “ensure a homeland
that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and
other hazards.”21 To achieve this vision, the DHS describes its core missions in five areas:22
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Prevent terrorism and enhance security
Secure and manage our borders
Enforce and administer our immigration laws
Safeguard and secure cyberspace
Ensure resilience to disasters

A National Guard realignment under the DHS potentially contributes—conceptually and logically—to
four of the five above missions. As a complete military
force organized, trained, and equipped by the DoD, the
National Guard is a geographically dispersed military
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force capable of performing the full range of military
operations. Similar to the DoD, the National Guard
has both combat-capable air and ground services complete with the necessary administrative, intelligence,
operational, logistical, and communications support
required for performing and sustaining any military
operation. Therefore, the National Guard can logically support each of the previously mentioned DHS
mission areas (with some question as to their capabilities to safeguard and secure cyberspace) through its
military capability. Since this capability maps well to
most of the DHS mission areas, realigning the National Guard under the DHS makes sense operationally.
However, such realignment makes less sense legally,
politically, and even economically as numerous laws,
policies, and regulations would require amendments
or significant re-writing. Moreover, while we lack direct precedent for comparison, exploring the USCG
realignment under the DHS from the Department of
Transportation can serve as a useful starting point for
further assessment of a National Guard realignment
of similar intent and purpose.
EXPLORATION OF USCG REALIGNMENT
UNDER THE DHS
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 realigned the
USCG to the DHS from the Department of Transportation.23 The major difference between this realignment
and a National Guard realignment is that the USCG
was a federal entity prior to the realignment and remained a federal entity post-realignment. While the
intent was similar—to simplify and streamline operational and administrative functions under a singular
department structure—the mechanics of the USCG
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realignment in comparison to a National Guard realignment are vastly different. In comparing a USCG
realignment with a hypothetical National Guard realignment, we must consider affinity to mission as a
primary concern in debating the potential pros and
cons of any such organizational restructuring.
In the case of its realignment to the DHS, the USCG
maintained (and continues to maintain) a direct affinity to the mission(s) of the DHS. As a maritime interdiction force, the USCG performs a range of security
operations throughout the national waterways and
along our water borders, which are among the primary areas of responsibility for the DHS. The USCG
also supports other DHS agencies in customs and immigration missions at ports of embarkation and debarkation throughout the United States. As well, the
USCG maintains robust aerial urban search and rescue (USAR) capabilities, oil and other environmental
hazard control and extraction capabilities, and numerous other aerial and maritime capabilities frequently
required in post-disaster operations led by the DHS.
Therefore, the USCG’s affinity to the DHS mission is
direct and contributory. Further, as a federal entity,
the USCG serves under federal command and control,
and is funded by the federal government. There is no
state responsibility or legal structure under which it
must operate. Therefore, while some may point to this
realignment as a useful comparison for consideration
of a National Guard realignment, it is quite different.
Despite the absence of a useful comparison as a
starting point, we were able to speak with individual
subjects representing a range of relevant backgrounds
and experiences. Through the interview process, these
subjects assisted us in developing an analysis of some
of the potential benefits, as well as drawbacks, of

15

realigning the National Guard under the DHS. The
following sections summarize our analysis by offering
discussions on the perceived pros and cons of such a
realignment—taken from subject matter expert testimony—as well as a series of brief recommendations
based on the resulting analysis contained herein.
EXAMINING A NATIONAL GUARD
REALIGNMENT UNDER THE DHS
To perform the research and analysis required for
this monograph, our primary method of data collection was through personal interviews with a range of
professionals able to provide relevant experience and
subject matter expertise. We incorporated the perspectives of individuals from the DoD, the DHS, the
USCG, FEMA, and National Guardsmen, as well state
and local emergency managers, to gain a broad understanding of the potential benefits and drawbacks of a
realignment. As part of our analysis, we assessed the
role of the National Guard in domestic security and disaster response as well as the potential complications
that a realignment may have on the National Guard’s
ability to continue supporting the DoD in overseas
contingency operations. Given our approach working
with human subjects as our main source of data collection, we used a qualitative approach to data collection
and analysis to synthesize material and make observations from the resulting data.
Drawbacks of Realignment.
Realigning the National Guard under the DHS
raises several obvious issues. At the federal level, there
are literally dozens of policies, procedures, directives,
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instructions, doctrinal publications, joint publications,
service-specific field manuals, tactics, techniques, and
procedures, as well as other strategic, operational, and
tactical guidance that would require major revisions
under a realignment. At the state level, realigning
the National Guard under the DHS and making it a
federal entity would require major revisions to nearly
every state emergency management plan and associated guidance document. Legally, most of Title 32 of
the U.S.C. - National Guard, would require revisions.
Other relevant acts like the Stafford Act and Economy
Act—both of which covers expense reimbursement
for DoD actions during disaster response and relief—
would require rewriting with the addition of the National Guard as a federal entity. However, revisions
to Title 32, the Stafford Act, Economy Act, and other
legal references may not be as problematic as the revisions to the legal core of the United States: the U.S.
Constitution.
As the supreme legal foundation of the United
States and its principles, the Constitution clearly defines the separation of powers between individual sovereign states and the federal government. Command
and control of the Armed Forces and state militia or
the National Guard are critical components of the federalist construct used in drafting the Constitution. In
addition to removing state-level military capabilities
and Governor control of the National Guard, realigning the National Guard under a federal department
would effectively nullify the federalist construct as it
applies to the command and control of domestic military forces. This has the potential to create a culture
of militarized federal security and disaster response
that may not only be socially unwelcome, but politically and financially unwelcome as well. While the
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drawbacks are significant and should not be underestimated, they are more impractical than impossible.
States and the federal government regularly revise polices, laws, and other guiding documents in
response to ongoing political debates, lobbying, social movements, and other influential activities. These
revisions would require a major time investment
and significant labor to accomplish, but are feasible
nonetheless. However, numerous drawbacks to this
realignment stretch beyond the obvious superficial
changes required to laws, policies, and response doctrine. The next sub-sections represent a summary of
the drawbacks identified by our subjects during the
interview phase of the research.
Revisions to Relevant Laws and Policies.
I hope I’m not working in the National Guard Bureau
if they decide to realign the Guard to DHS. I’ll be rewriting policies until I retire.24

There are numerous challenges and drawbacks
to realigning the National Guard under the DHS.
However, revising—and in some cases completely
re-writing—the various laws and policies at both the
state and federal level is perhaps the most significant
drawback to a National Guard realignment. Each of
our interviewees—regardless of background—noted
this as a major obstacle. Due to the many works requiring change in this scenario, reviewing each law
or policy is beyond the scope of this project. That
said, the most significant revisions required relate to
the various laws influencing the use of the National
Guard for domestic operations. In particular, Title 32
of the U.S.C.—laws governing the National Guard—
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would require a massive re-write in each of its five
chapters (Organization, Personnel, Training, Service,
and Homeland Defense) to reflect a new alignment
under DHS.25 Additionally, 10 U.S.C. § 12403-12406
authorizes the President to call members of the National Guard into federal service of the United States;
or to “federalize” the National Guard for assistance
during periods of invasion, rebellion, or as otherwise
required, such as during periods of war.26 Under a realignment to the DHS, these laws would require revision—or perhaps deletion—to reflect the National
Guard’s new position as a federal entity. Perhaps
even more significant, Article I, Section 8; Article II,
Section 2; and Amendment X (depending on interpretation) of the Constitution require revision under a
proposed realignment, as the National Guard would
no longer reflect the state militia concept noted in the
Constitution.27
In addition to numerous legal changes, dozens of
DoD policies outlining the roles and responsibilities
of the National Guard in domestic missions require
attention and revision under a proposed realignment.
Specifically, Joint Publication 3-28: Defense Support of
Civil Authorities28 and the DoD Instruction 3025.22: The
Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil
Authorities29 would require significant attention and
revision following realignment. Federal budgeting
and resource allocation policies and strategies, similar state-level materials, and nearly every other document, plan, or procedure affecting the National Guard
at both the state and federal level—far too many to specifically note here—would also need to be addressed,
with significant revisions likely. Administratively
speaking, realigning the National Guard under the
DHS would require a massive amount of man-hours
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to update the various policies and laws required as a
result of such a change. And not to be overlooked in
this area is the fact that the United States currently has
both legal and policy mechanisms in place that allow
the National Guard to be integrated with the federal
government, whether federalized under Title 10 authority or used under a DSC arrangement, within an
assigned state or territory. Given the complexities of
accomplishing such a change and the fact that the U.S.
already has mechanisms in place to facilitate federal
use of the National Guard during security or disaster missions, the major required revisions to current
laws and policies present perhaps the most significant
drawback to realigning the National Guard under the
DHS. From a military perspective, Table 3 notes some
of the major laws and/or policies requiring attention
and revision under a proposed National Guard realignment to the DHS. However, the legal and policyoriented challenges are far from the only drawbacks
to such a change. While the above issues are administratively focused, there are strategic and operational
drawbacks as well.
The National Guard in the Homeland—Sample of Relevant Laws and Policies
Law/Authority

Description

Article I, Sec. 8

Constitutional authority given to Congress to provide for
defense of the nation; includes the authority to call forth the
militia—or National Guard—to execute the laws of the nation,
prevent insurrections and repel invasions; establishes the
legal precedent for using the National Guard during domestic
military operations.

Article II, Sec. 2

Establishes the President as the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States and of the National Guard
of the individual states when called into service of the United
States.

Table 3. Laws and Policies Relevant to the National
Guard in Domestic Operations.
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Law/Authority

Description

Amendment X

Reinforces the separation of powers concept by reserving the
rights and powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, to the states respectively; this can be interpreted
as the authority for a state governor to serve as Commander
in Chief of the state militia or National Guard.

10 U.S.C. § 1240312406

Authorizes the President to call members of the National
Guard into federal service of the United States; National Guard
forces operating under this authority are colloquially referred
as being in a “federalized” status.

Title 32 U.S.C.

Laws pertaining to the government and regulation of the
National Guard.

32 U.S.C. § 502f

Authorizes members of the National Guard to perform duties
and services in support of national interests at the request of
the President or Secretary of Defense while receiving federal
pay and benefits rather than state pay.

18 U.S.C. § 1385

Posse Comitatus Act: the principal intent of the Posse
Comitatus Act is to restrict the President and the federal
government from using federal military forces to perform law
enforcement activities and/or enforce laws within the states
and territories of the United States. The restrictions of Posse
Comitatus do not apply to the USCG or the National Guard
when operating in state controlled status.

42 U.S.C. § 5122

Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Relief Assistance
Act - Utilization of DoD Resources (section 5170b[C]).
This section specifies that when the preservation of life and
property are deemed necessary, at the request of a state
Governor, the President may authorize DoD resources to
assist in emergency and disaster relief at a 75% cost share to
the federal government.

DoD Directive
3025.18: Defense
Support of Civil
Authorities

DoD policy directive outlining the considerations, processes,
procedures, and responsibilities for providing military support
to state and local government agencies; also known as
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).

DoD Instruction
3025.22: The Use of
the National Guard
for Defense Support
of Civil Authorities

DoD policy directive that assigns the roles and responsibilities
for the National Guard to conduct defense support of civil
authorities operations.

DoD Directive
3160.01: Homeland
Defense Activities
Conducted by the
National Guard

DoD policy directive that assigns roles and responsibilities for
the National Guard to conduct homeland defense operations.

Table 3. Laws and Policies Relevant to the National
Guard in Domestic Operations. (cont.)
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Law/Authority

Description

Joint Publication
3-27: Homeland
Defense

DoD joint doctrine to “govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint homeland
defense operations and provides the guidance for U.S. military
coordination with other U.S. Government departments and
agencies during operations, and for U.S. military involvement
in multinational operations supporting homeland defense.”
(p. i.)

Joint Publication
3-28: Defense
Support of Civil
Authorities

DoD joint doctrine to “govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in DSCA operations.”
(p. i.)

For a more comprehensive list of relevant documents, see Appendix G of Joint
Publication 3-28.

Table 3. Laws and Policies Relevant to the National
Guard in Domestic Operations. (cont.)
Reducing the DoD’s Operational Reserve
Footprint.
If the Guard moves to DHS, who is the operational reserve force for DoD?30

Largely as a result of the ongoing War on Terror, the National Guard’s mission and purpose has
changed. In recent years, the National Guard has
shifted from what was once a strategic reserve of the
DoD to more of an operational reserve force in readiness. As a supplement to the current active and reserve
components of the Armed Forces, National Guard
units throughout the United States have deployed in
support of both Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In the current operational landscape, the National Guard has provided
a valuable extension to the U.S. military footprint at
home and abroad. Since the current War on Terror
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commenced in the fall of 2001, the National Guard
has demonstrated its ability to legitimately serve as
an operational reserve force for the DoD while also
retaining its utility for stateside service—albeit reduced during periods of deployment—when required
by the Governors. If a National Guard realignment to
the DHS occurs, this raises the question as to who or
what will take the place of the National Guard as an
operational reserve force for the DoD?
While it can be argued that the dual-theater requirements during the War on Terror are a rare occurrence, the ability to conduct two simultaneous
wars has been the required standard for determining
military size for over 20 years. In addition, although
there are some ambiguities in current guidance, nearly every major defense policy, doctrine, and strategic
document affirms this multi-theater capability as necessary to meet current and future global challenges,
while also sustaining capabilities for crisis response,
humanitarian assistance, regional deterrence, HD,
and CS.31 Therefore, with the known requirements to
conduct multi-region campaigns unlikely to change,
it is imperative to have a ready operational reserve
to supplement federal forces for future conflicts that
may arise. If the National Guard were to be realigned
under the DHS—presumably for only domestic missions—the DoD’s ability to conduct multi-region operations would be significantly diminished. Losing
the National Guard as either a strategic or operational
reserve force could have additional cascading effects
on future strategic decision-making and weaken the
perceived strength of the U.S. military apparatus. Beyond this, should the National Guard realign to the
DHS, it would, as a result, lose the DoD budget support, which currently makes up roughly 95% of the
National Guard’s annual budget.
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Eliminating DoD Budget Support.
The best thing DoD does for the Guard is open its
checkbook.32

Aside from the many obvious logistical, legal, and
policy-oriented challenges associated with realigning
the National Guard under the DHS, shifting budgetary appropriations for the National Guard from the
DoD to the DHS is not as simple as changing the routing number on a deposit slip. Currently, the National
Guard receives approximately 95% of its $27.3 billion
budget from the DoD; the remaining 5% is paid for—
in varying degrees—by the states for use of state facilities and for periods of SAD training or activation.33
DoD funding provides the means and resources to
sustain the defense of the nation—and the National
Guard is part of this funding. However, the National
Guard is not a domestic response force. By design,
it is principally funded and equipped to serve as an
operational reserve force to the DoD. Realigning the
National Guard to the DHS—in terms of budgeting—
requires more than simply changing annual defense
appropriations to reflect a loss of National Guard-specific requirements. Such a shift also requires revisiting
the National Guard’s position and role in the defense
and security spectrum. Revising this role to reflect a
solely domestic and federally controlled mission will
undoubtedly change the equipment, personnel, and
training needed of the National Guard in its entirety,
as well as remove all state-specific affiliations that otherwise differentiate the National Guard from the federal military. Such a dramatic and anticipated change
in force structure and mission focus would largely
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re-brand the National Guard, ultimately leading to
additional unintended consequences and drawbacks.
Loss of the “Hometown Force” Concept.
Guard personnel are members of their communities;
under DHS we would lose that attachment-to-place
mindset that so many of us value.34

The National Guard is comprised of volunteers
who primarily serve in the state they reside. As a
result, Guardsmen have opportunities to perform
military service that directly benefits their local communities, home state, and neighboring states through
EMAC agreements. Such service instills a sense of
duty, pride, and connection to the communities in
which the National Guard serves. According to several National Guard personnel, this “hometown force
mindset of helping friends and neighbors”35 generally
seems to improve recruiting and retention, as well
as pride in service among members of the National
Guard.36 During our interviews, most National Guard
personnel expressed concern that a realignment under the DHS would effectively negate this hometown
force mindset, as the National Guard would hypothetically become a federal entity. According to our interviewees, since a realignment would diminish one of
the main attractions for service in the National Guard,
it would presumably have a negative effect on recruiting and retention.37 Further, National Guard personnel
often bring unique and valuable area knowledge and
expertise to security or response operations that federal personnel may not have. As federal employees,
National Guard personnel may not operate in their
home communities, which could have a detrimental
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effect on a security or response mission. Moreover,
although these issues and their effect on performance
are less quantifiable than changing laws and budgets,
the loss of the hometown force concept unique only to
the National Guard is significant to its personnel, as
evidenced in our interviews.
Loss of Supplemental Law Enforcement Capability.
Right now we’re a force multiplier for state law enforcement if needed . . . but if we (National Guard)
serve under DHS as essentially another federal military force, because of Posse Comitatus, Governors
can’t use us to support state and local law enforcement
the way they can now . . . and that could be a game
changer.38

When activated for duty in a state-controlled status (either SAD or Title 32 status), the National Guard
can engage in and support law enforcement activities
within their state, as directed and authorized by their
Governor. The restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act
do not apply to National Guard troops serving in either a SAD or Title 32 status. As such, state governors
can—and often do—request National Guard support
to law enforcement during periods of civil unrest,
special security events, state emergencies or disasters,
and other operations as designated by the Governor.
Realigning the National Guard under the DHS would
effectively transform the National Guard into another
federal military force and would subject them to Posse
Comitatus Act restrictions, thereby eliminating a Governor’s ability to use them for state and local law enforcement support. This reduces—or at the very least
marginalizes—state and local law enforcement capabilities during periods of increased need. Therefore, a
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reduction in law enforcement capabilities and capacities is a notable drawback to realigning the National
Guard under the DHS. Any significant policy change
that reduces a governor’s power and authority in this
manner—whether through law enforcement capabilities or any other reduction– brings political backlash
as a result. Such political challenges are also a notable
drawback to realigning the National Guard under
the DHS.
Political Challenges.
Guard control during emergencies and disasters has
always been a political hot potato. Removing the
Guard from the Governors’ control is a non-starter.39

Command authority of the National Guard has
long been an issue of political sensitivity for state
Governors in relation to the federal government.40 As
discussed earlier, recent legislative debates and posturing between state Governors and the DoD have resulted in a tug-of-war of sorts over control of the National Guard during domestic emergencies. Through
such things as the DSC initiative, state Governors have
fought successfully to retain command and control of
National Guard forces in their states when not federalized under Title 10 authority. Realigning the National
Guard under the DHS for use in security or disaster
response missions would remove all military capability from the Governors’ authority, and result in a state
government lacking sufficient military resources for
CS roles and missions that it would otherwise source
from its state-based National Guard assets. Given the
recent progress between the DoD and the Governors
to mutually agree on a command arrangement linking
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both state and federal military forces during designated emergencies or disasters, a proposed realignment
of the National Guard into federal control under the
DHS is not politically palatable. The National Guard
provides Governors with a unique military capability to enhance state operations, whether in support
of law enforcement or other designated CS capacities
like disaster response. Relinquishing command and
control of the National Guard is something the Governors will zealously fight against. Therefore, such a realignment—aside from the other noted drawbacks—is
unlikely to be accepted without a lengthy debate and
fight that could take years to resolve.
OTHER NOTABLE DRAWBACKS
The previous sections summarized the several
recurring themes extracted from the interview data
concerning potential drawbacks of a National Guard
realignment under the DHS. In addition to the specific
drawbacks discussed above, our interviews revealed
other drawbacks that, although less repetitive among
the entirety of the interview data, are notable and
worth mentioning.
Slowed Military Response to Emergencies
and Disasters.
National Guardsmen are civilian-soldiers. They are
members of their communities first, many with careers
and full or part-time employment. There is typically a
24-hour expected time for mobilization and response
to most situations, following authorization by the
Governor.41 Federal control of the National Guard will
not change this. According to our interviewees, DHS
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control of the National Guard would add an additional layer of bureaucracy that could potentially lead to a
slower response time than when the National Guard
is state-controlled.42 In such a realignment proposal,
unless National Guard troops are designated full-time
federal troops and equivalent to the active component
of the Armed Forces—and therefore directly deployable by the DHS at all times—administratively aligning state National Guard units under the DHS will not
likely lessen response time.
DHS is Not a Military Organization.
The DHS, despite being a large, segmented, bureaucratic department within the federal government,
is not a military organization. Moreover, while many
employees within the department are former military
and some elements of the structure may resemble that
of a military organization, the DHS is not the military.
This means at the very least, there is a cultural difference between the National Guard and the DHS that
can lead to increased friction, confusion, and complexity that ultimately affects operational effectiveness.43
If given a larger sample of subjects, it is likely that
several more drawbacks to a National Guard realignment would have been identified. The drawbacks
discussed above and summarized in Table 4 below
only represent the main or recurring themes present
throughout the interview and data collection process
of our research. While this list is in no way comprehensive or all-inclusive, it is representative of the most
commonly held perspectives and opinions regarding
potential drawbacks to date. While the drawbacks
noted are significant, we also identified several potential benefits to realigning the National Guard under
the DHS.
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Noted Drawbacks

Remarks

Revisions to laws and
policies

Major revisions to dozens of laws, policies, and
associated/relevant planning and/or guidance
documents required; significant time investment;
change could have unintended consequences.

Reducing/Eliminating
DoD’s operational reserve

The National Guard serves as an operational reserve
force for the DoD. Transition to the DHS would
effectively weaken DoD’s dual-theater warfighting
capability requirements for future operations.

Eliminating DoD budget
support from the National
Guard

The National Guard receives ~ 95% budget support
from the DoD. Transition to the DHS would
(presumably) eliminate this support.

Loss of the “hometown
force” concept

Realigning to the DHS would negate the local feel
and attachment National Guard members have by
serving their communities. As a federal entity, it
becomes less intimate.

Loss of supplemental law
enforcement support

As a federal force under the DHS, Posse Comitatus
would restrict National Guard actions. This would
significantly reduce (or all together eliminate) a
governor’s ability to supplement law enforcement
efforts within his/her state.

Political challenges

Friction between state governors and the DoD
persists during state and national emergencies.
Changing the National Guard from a state asset to a
federal asset will only create further tension.

Slowed military response

Additional bureaucratic layer to navigate before
deploying National Guard troops to assist during
emergencies may slow response time.

DHS is not a military
organization

Cultural divide and the DoD (civilian entity) and the
National Guard (military entity) may elicit greater
friction and affect administrative and operational
performance.

Table 4. Potential Drawbacks of Realignment.
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BENEFITS OF REALIGNMENT
There are many drawbacks to realigning the National Guard under the DHS. However, the potential
benefits of such a change are also worth considering.
The proceeding sections summarize the main themes
noted in our interview data relative to the potential
benefits of realigning the National Guard to the DHS.
Reduced Cost Associated with National
Guard Budget.
We need to build an effective defense, security, and
response apparatus for as cheap as possible.44

Cost influences decision-making across many
levels of government. While the DoD has the largest
budget of any government department or agency, this
does not make it immune to budget pressures and
the need to allocate resources effectively to ensure an
optimal defense. The Defense Department funds its
combat requirements as a first priority. As part of the
larger national defense apparatus, the National Guard
serves as an operational reserve to the federal military,
and thus receives most of its budget support from the
DoD. However, in terms of effective budgeting and
cost reduction, many in and around the DoD question
the need for specific programs, weapons systems, and
other costly items that are too narrowly purposed to
justify their continued funding and expenses. Some
elements of National Guard organization and equipment allocation raise questions as to their necessity
for a predominantly domestic mission. The ongoing
discussion over the use of Apache helicopters in the
National Guard sits at the center of this debate.45 If
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realigned to serve under the DHS, such wartime programs and expenses relative to the National Guard
may no longer be necessary to fund as a result of an
exclusive domestic support role, thereby reducing
the budget requirements of the DoD and ultimately
saving taxpayer money.
The question some raise is simple: Why does the
National Guard need Apache attack helicopters or
tank battalions if they are not training and preparing
for a wartime mission? The counter-argument to this
question—that many in the DoD and the National
Guard support—is that the National Guard is the operational reserve force for the DoD. In order to fulfill
this role, the National Guard should be equipped and
trained for wartime missions similar to any branch
of the federal military. Critics, in contrast, look to the
future and suggest that the National Guard’s role in
the War on Terror is beyond its design, and lessons
learned from over-extending the National Guard
will result in a more defined domestic support role
in the future, leading to less combat requirements,
and instead will be more directly oriented to domestic CS. In terms of realigning the National Guard to
the DHS, this change would result in the defunding
of wartime requirements like tanks and attack helicopters. According to some, realignment in this sense
would provide a catalyst to optimizing the National
Guard for domestic security and response missions,
reduce unnecessary costs for seldom-used wartime
requirements, and redirect spending to more useful
applications, maximizing domestic military action in
response situations.46 Beyond this, some in the DoD
suggest that nearly 110,000 out of approximately
354,000 National Guard personnel “have no utility in
defense missions.”47 While there is no reliable method
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of verification for this claim, as the interpretation of
“utility for defense missions” can vary widely, even
if half (55,000) of the suggested 110,000 Guardsmen
have no utility in defense missions, we can logically
wonder why these personnel fall under the DoD
budget umbrella. In other words, why are we funding this? According to those advocating this position,
realigning the National Guard under the DHS would
result in a restructuring of the force to ensure we are
funding appropriate training and capabilities for domestic missions. Regardless, the potential net impact
on cost reduction (if any) is dependent on the mission. Our approach to budgeting allocation needs to
consider mission requirements to ensure our military
forces are appropriately equipped and postured to accomplish these missions. By refocusing the mission of
the National Guard on domestic issues, costs to meet
domestic mission requirements may be reduced, but
there are other functions that still must be considered.
Cost is and always will be to some extent influenced
by the mission.
Streamlined Capabilities Sourcing.
Another potential benefit of a National Guard realignment to the DHS concerns resource and capabilities sourcing during security and response missions.
Some suggest that under a single federal command
structure (rather than the National Guard being controlled by individual state Governors within the states
themselves), the federal government would be better
positioned to more effectively source and deploy specific capabilities to areas affected by emergencies or
disasters, as well as provide security for both planned
and unplanned security situations.48 Assuming policy
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agreements and memorandums of understanding
are in place allowing for deployment of federal National Guard troops within the states (most likely at
the request of the Governors), deploying a CS-specific
military capability from the federal government to the
states could simplify and improve disaster response
and security operations. Again, such a claim is difficult
to support and defend, as it deals entirely in hypothetical situations and is based solely on the opinions and
conjecture of those interviewed. Nonetheless, streamlined capabilities and less confusion was repeatedly
mentioned as a potential benefit to realignment.
Reduction of the DoD Role in Civil Support.
Despite regularly training and preparing for response scenarios, federal military forces participate
in domestic response infrequently. However, when
the size and scope of an incident overwhelms local
and state authorities and their ability to respond effectively, civil authorities sometimes request military
support from the DoD. Although federal military response often provides an unparalleled capability that
can be critical to saving lives, there is a high cost associated with DSCA operations that must be considered
as part of the request and response process.49 Given
the varying nature of each emergency or disaster resulting in military support, it is difficult to estimate
the average cost of a DSCA mission. Even with Stafford Act provisions outlining reimbursement ratios
and procedures in an effort to simplify the process
for DSCA, it is a costly mission area for the DoD.50 As
well, DSCA missions are influenced by a number of
laws and policies that often restrict the DoD’s ability
to perform specific support functions and coordinate
effectively with state and local responders.51 Realign34

ing the National Guard under the DHS might actually serve to reduce or remove the DoD’s CS role all
together—something that can be argued as both a
benefit and a drawback. Realignment of the National
Guard under the DHS may serve to limit the need
for federal military support during major incidents,
thereby reducing the DoD’s DSCA mission profile.
Whether this will result in money saved over time requires comparing past and projected DSCA costs with
past and projected National Guard costs to support
similar operations; data we do not have at the time of
this writing. Regardless, according to our interviews,
the assumption is that realigning the National Guard
to the DHS—where it would serve in an exclusively
domestic support role—will likely reduce the DoD’s
DSCA mission significantly. This mission reduction
may translate into cost savings, better-coordinated
military response through a DHS entity, and less
political tension between the DoD and the States in
future operations as a result.
ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL BENEFITS
In addition to the noted benefits above, throughout our interviews we identified other potential positive outcomes of a National Guard realignment to the
DHS. For instance, USAR is often critical in disaster
response scenarios. Fortunately, the National Guard
is well equipped for USAR missions. In many cases,
local and state governments do not have the necessary
resources—mainly helicopters—to perform USAR adequately over a disaster area. Realigning the National
Guard to the DHS would enhance federal USAR capabilities and capacities by combining National Guard
and USCG assets to perform this critical mission
requirement.
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As well, realigning the National Guard to the DHS
may have the added benefit of improving federal resource utilization timelines through the avoidance
of the unpopular mission assignment process. If the
National Guard operates under the DHS and there
is an identified need for a military capability during
a disaster or emergency, FEMA would have direct
oversight—presumably—over the National Guard
and would be capable of directing the appropriate
response resources quickly and more efficiently than
waiting on the traditional mission assignment process
to occur.
Beyond the operational benefits noted above, the
confusion over National Guard duty status determination would all but disappear. The National Guard
would likely serve under a revised version of Title 32,
allowing for undisputed federal funding as a federal
asset under the DHS. This would improve the overall
pay and benefits issues sometimes encountered when
National Guard forces on SAD status operate across
state borders, as in Hurricane Sandy.52 More broadly,
a realignment would serve as a military force multiplier, enhancing the total military capability of the
federal government in response to a domestic security event or disaster response requirement. Between
the Air National Guard, Army National Guard, and
USCG, the DHS would have a full military force complete with air, land, and sea capabilities, to support
most domestic requirements. With another military
force under the DHS (in addition to the USCG), coordination and resource allocation between FEMA and
the military would likely improve.
Table 5 summarizes the previous sections of noted benefits to realigning the National Guard under
the DHS.
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Noted Benefits

Remarks

Reduced cost and budget for the
National Guard

Restructure and shift priorities for National
Guard funding toward a domestic support set
of mission capabilities and requirements. End
funding of (expensive) exclusively combat
requirements.

Streamlined capabilities sourcing

As a counter to the above drawback suggesting a
slowed response, some argue that under the DHS
the National Guard would be able to more rapidly
deploy due to a full-time military duty status.

Reduction of the DoD role in CS

DSCA is a costly mission for the DoD (and
taxpayers by extension) that does not directly
contribute to defense of the nation. With the
National Guard as a federal entity under the DHS,
the requirement for DoD support and the DSCA
mission would be largely reduced, thereby saving
money.

Improved USAR capabilities postdisaster

Local and state entities in many cases lack
necessary resources (helicopters) to perform
larger search and rescue missions. The National
Guard under the DHS will be better positioned
to provide needed USAR support in conjunction
with the USCG.

Duty status clarity

Under the DHS, the National Guard would have
only one available duty status, rather than the
three it can currently serve in (SAD, T32, T10).

Table 5. Potential Benefits of Realignment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Building on the analysis of the benefits and drawbacks previously discussed, this final section of the
monograph outlines a series of recommendations
targeted toward optimizing the National Guard for
domestic security and disaster response operations,
while retaining utility for overseas contingency support to the DoD. The recommendations are intended
for consideration by the DoD, the DHS, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as ways to improve the

37

challenges and issues detailed in this report. We base
these recommendations on our review of the available
interview data collected during the research process.
As noted previously, we used a detailed analytical
coding process to identify, code, and extract themes
from the interview data that led us to our conclusions
and the following recommendations.
In order to design the project, conduct the research,
analyze the data, and develop our findings, we first
needed to determine the question(s) we were attempting to answer. Given the question: “what are the benefits and drawbacks of realigning the [National] Guard
under the [Department] of Homeland Security?”53 our
research developed several benefits and drawbacks
worth consideration. Identifying benefits and drawbacks of a National Guard realignment to the DHS,
however, falls short of anything actionable. Therefore,
as a result of our analysis, we developed a series of
recommendations that suggest methods to better integrate National Guard/military functionality into the
DHS, while retaining utility for support to the DoD
when needed. These recommendations help to optimize the National Guard by enhancing its domestic
relevance for future requirements, while ensuring the
National Guard remains—as it has been and should
be—the strategic and operational military reserve for
the country. We will engage in conflict again in the
future, and the National Guard needs to be there to
provide this capability. Therefore, as our first recommendation, we can say, with absolute conviction and
confidence in the data, that the National Guard should
remain in its current capacity, as both a state-based
military asset and a federal asset to the DoD when
required.
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Recommendation 1:
Do Not Realign the National Guard Under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Disasters are opportunities to execute quickly and decisively. Realigning
the National Guard under the DHS adds an additional
layer of management and bureaucracy that will—in
all likelihood—complicate the process in a time when
speed is of the essence. As well, disasters create problems at the local level. As such, local problems require
local decisions and local decision-makers. In its current state capacity, the National Guard is part of the
local solution. In a proposed federal capacity, it is not.
Instead of realigning the National Guard, the DoD,
the DHS, and the NGB should consider future challenges, and their approaches to these challenges, in
the context of authorities, capabilities, capacities, and
partnerships. Using these categories, each organization will be better positioned to assess and meet future
challenges with both comprehensive and effective
solutions.
Recommendation 2:
Expand the Current Homeland Response Force Capability Profile. Homeland Response Forces (HRF) are
designated National Guard-sourced units, which are
strategically located and regionally oriented throughout the country; each of the 10 FEMA regions (Figure
2 below) contains at least one HRF unit. Table 6 notes
the current location and associated FEMA region of
each of the 10 HRF units. The more than 500 Guardsmen that comprise the HRF units assemble within
12 hours of activation and, when required, deploy to
designated areas to conduct military-specific opera-
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tions in response to a range of emergencies, disasters,
and similar destabilizing situations.54 With over 5,000
Guardsmen, the total HRF national profile is relatively
small in comparison to the greater than 354,000 personnel that make up the National Guard currently.55
To meet the growing emphasis on HD and HS, and
to be able to extend military-specific capabilities to
the DHS during periods of emergency or disaster, the
National Guard Bureau should consider expanding
its current HRF strength from 10 regionally-oriented
units throughout the FEMA regions to 20 units. Doubling the current HRF capability profile will not only
enhance response capabilities at any given location,
but also, with proper geographic placement of the
new units relative to current HRF units, this expansion could considerably shorten current estimated response times due to greater geographic disbursement
and coverage.
An alternative approach to expanding current
HRF capabilities, without creating additional HRF
units, involves placing designated National Guard
units in an operational control (OPCON) status to the
DHS on a rotational basis. In this model, the selected
units would receive DHS funding for the duration of
their OPCON status to the DHS. Augmenting the current HRF posture with rotating National Guard units
from OPCON to the DHS theoretically would enhance
the current HRF readiness profile and response capability. As well, this allows the Governors to maintain
control over their National Guard forces, except when
augmented to the DHS, and ensures a standing military response capability at all times. In addition to further integrating the National Guard into the DHS on a
rotational basis, the NGB should expand joint training
and readiness efforts between HRF units and the DHS
Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP).56 In Title 32
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status, Guardsmen serving as part of HRF units can
attend DHS-funded training at the CDP. Such partnerships should be expanded and strengthened.

Figure 2. FEMA Regions.
FEMA Region

HRF Host State(s)

I

VT, MA, CT

II

NY, NJ

III

PA

IV

GA

V

OH

VI

TX

VII

MO

VIII

UT

IX

CA

X

WA

Table 6. Homeland Response Force Regional
Locations by State.
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Recommendation 3:
Consider DHS Funding Support for National Guard
Civil Support (CS) Missions. As part of its Homeland
Security series in 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report outlining the future roles and readiness challenges faced by the National Guard in the context of CS. Among other things,
this report noted the funding challenges affecting the
National Guard’s readiness to perform its CS mission. Since the DoD only funds the National Guard’s
combat readiness requirements, the National Guard
is expected to use its combat resources and funding
to perform CS functions when required. The GAO report noted that this funding model (specific only to
combat readiness) often leaves the National Guard ill
prepared to meet its CS mission requirements.57 As
an alternative to the current model, GAO proposed
that the National Guard receive funding from the
DHS to organize, train, and equip specifically for CS
missions.58 Modeled after the way the USCG receives
funding from both the DHS and the DoD for specific
missions, GAO suggested that the National Guard
could benefit from a similar arrangement in which it
receives its combat and wartime readiness funding
from the DoD and its CS readiness funding from the
DHS. As a result, the DHS could temporarily assume
command and control of the National Guard during
periods of state declared or national emergencies. Revisions to laws and policies would be required if this
recommendation were to be implemented. However,
such a funding arrangement could achieve the desired
effect by giving the DHS a mechanism to integrate organic military capability into its security and response
posture while allowing the National Guard to remain
as an operational and strategic reserve to the DoD’s
warfighting mission.
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Recommendation 4:
Authorize the Reserve Component (Title 10) to Supplement the DHS for Civil Support (CS). Although unrelated to the National Guard, it is worth considering
whether the reserve component of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps can serve as a useful alternative to the National Guard during CS missions
under the DHS. Since tension persists between the
governors and the DoD during disaster response operations, we can assume that similar tension will be
present between the governors and the DHS when
command of the National Guard is at the center of the
discussion. With no mutually agreeable scenario conceivable, using the reserve component to supplement
the DHS during CS missions is a viable alternative.
Instead of a state asset falling under federal control
for domestic operations, the reserve component, as
a federal entity under Title 10, would remain under
federal control and under the temporary command
authority of the DHS. With the expanding interest in
using the reserve component as a supplement to CS
operations and the resulting recent adoption of 10
U.S.C. § 12304a,59 the reserve component is now a viable stand-by military force for response to a disaster
or emergency.60 With some adjustments to policy and
relevant laws, using the reserve component to support the DHS in a similar fashion to governor support
under 12304a is worth considering.
Recommendation 5:
Further Study on Situations that Require Federalizing
the National Guard. Finally, this research revealed a
great deal of concern for catastrophic event response
scenarios among members of the National Guard,
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FEMA, the DHS, the DoD, and other relevant responseoriented agencies. In many cases, our respondents
asked rhetorically, “What do we do when ‘the big
one’ happens?” While the DoD has plans for complex
catastrophes,61 many question the National Guard’s
role in such a scenario. Since this research examined
whether using the National Guard in a federal capacity under the DHS had merit or not, a similar line of
questioning could examine the triggers for federalizing the National Guard during a complex catastrophe
or similar incident of regional or national significance.
Additionally, standing agreements with foreign nations—such as the State Partnership Programs—that
could see the National Guard used in support of overseas operations would be affected under a National
Guard realignment to the DHS, or a mass mobilization of the National Guard to federal service. While
such issues are beyond the scope of this research effort, further consideration of the potential effect on
these programs is warranted. Given that we know
very little about hypothetical situations that would require a mass mobilization of the National Guard into
federal service, we recommend that the DoD and the
DHS consider funding additional research to better
understand and conceptualize the triggers for such a
requirement. What are the triggering mechanisms or
criteria for federalizing the National Guard? Under
what circumstances would federalization be considered an automatic or mandatory requirement? What
cascading effects on partnership programs—if any—
should we expect from a mobilization? Generating
greater knowledge and understanding of the specific
circumstances necessitating a broad federalization of
the National Guard would help both the states and
federal government to better anticipate and prepare
for such scenarios. In addition, with better prepared44

ness comes better performance, both of which are critical before, during, and after a complex catastrophe.
Table 7 summarizes the suggested recommendations resulting from this analysis and discussed in the
previous sections.
Recommendation

Remarks

Do not realign the National
Guard under the DHS.

All disasters are local and require local decisions
and local responders. As a state asset, the National
Guard is local; as a federal asset, they are not.

Expand the current HRF
capability profile.

Realign funding where excesses are noted and
use this resource shift to increase the current
HRF capability two-fold from 10 to 20 HRF units
strategically positioned throughout the country.
Maximize HRF involvement in CS missions.

Consider DHS funding support
for National Guard CS missions.

Building on a 2008 GAO recommendation,
authorizing DHS funding for National Guard CS
operations would facilitate temporary military
capability integration into the DHS when required
while preserving the operational reserve footprint
of the DoD for wartime requirements.

Authorize reserve component to
support DHS.

Given the noted tensions between the states
and federal government over control of the
National Guard, using the reserve component
to supplement the DHS during disasters or
emergencies is a suggested alternative.

Commission and conduct
studies on triggers to federalize
the National Guard.

Further examination of triggers required to
federalize the National Guard would offer further
clarity to the ongoing discussion here. When and
why does the National Guard most need to serve in
a federal status?

Table 7. Summary of Suggested Study
Recommendations.
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CONCLUSION
Despite consistent instability in the Middle East
and the current rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) as a threat to the United States, the defense drawdown in Afghanistan continues. As the
U.S. military continues to reset its force following 15
years of sustained combat operations, it will reorient
and prepare for anticipated contingencies throughout
the world. While the current global environment projects instability, uncertainty, and the likely need for
military intervention at some point in the future, there
is an expanding interest in securing and protecting
the homeland from external threats, aggression, and
potential disasters. As the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces continue training for their
warfighting mission, we will see the National Guard
redirect some of its focus toward HD and HS, while
remaining the strategic and operational reserve to the
DoD for overseas contingency operations.
As evidenced in some of the most significant disasters and emergencies in recent memory, the future
of HD and HS missions require military capability.
Whereas the DHS and its many agencies and organizations will remain the lead federal agency during HS
missions and will assist in CS, the DoD will continue
to lead HD efforts while assisting in CS. As a state or
federal military asset with both defense and security
mission support capabilities, the National Guard will
be involved in each mission area within the defense,
security, and CS spectrum discussed earlier. Where
these operations overlap is where the command of the
National Guard becomes an issue of debate.

46

Despite clearly defined laws and policies establishing unquestioned command authority of the National Guard in three distinct duty statuses, some still
question whether the utility of the National Guard is
best suited for service within the DHS. As this project
discussed, there are several benefits and drawbacks to
realigning the National Guard under the DHS. Some
of the benefits identified include optimizing the National Guard by eliminating excess and unnecessary
costs associated with seldom-used combat capabilities; streamlining and simplifying military capabilities
sourcing during disasters or emergencies; a potential
reduction of the DoD role in CS, resulting in less DoD
cost expenditures; improved urban search and rescue capabilities; and clearer command and control
arrangements with the National Guard as a solely
federal entity. Conversely, drawbacks to realignment
include numerous required revisions to laws and
policies; loss of the National Guard as a strategic and
operational reserve for the DoD; loss of DoD budget
support of the National Guard; loss of the hometown
force concept unique only to the National Guard; loss
of supplemental law enforcement capabilities for the
states; political challenges; potentially slower response
due to the mechanistic and cumbersome nature of the
DHS; and a culture conflict between the DHS and the
National Guard. As a result of our interview findings
and the noted benefits and drawbacks, we concluded
our research with five recommendations.
Our recommendations are intended to improve
and further integrate military capability into future
DHS missions. In addition to a clear recommendation
not to realign the National Guard under the DHS, our
recommendations call for expansion of the current
HRF capability organic to the National Guard; consid-
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eration of DHS funding support for National Guard
CS missions; authorizing the reserve component of
the Armed Forces to supplement DHS security and
response operations through changes to funding and
relevant legislation; and a recommendation to fund
and conduct further study on the potential triggers for
the federalization of the National Guard in response
to a complex, multi-state or regional catastrophe.
Whereas these recommendations are detailed and
specific, they are not exhaustive. There are numerous
other factors to consider with regard to a hypothetical
National Guard realignment to the DHS that are beyond the intended scope of this project. For instance,
there are significant personnel implications of a realignment that must considered. The DoD has welldeveloped benefits and incentive programs in terms
of recruitment, education, and retirement, among
others. The DHS in contrast, does not. What would be
the impact of a realignment on these benefits and incentives for National Guardsmen? Questions like this,
that are beyond the scope of our research, must still be
assessed prior to major structural and organizational
changes. Per the scope of this effort, if our recommendations are implemented, they can improve the current and ongoing challenges presented within the HD,
HS, and CS spectrum. Whether these suggestions are
implemented or not will not change the fact that the
United States will continue to face obstacles to protecting and defending the homeland and responding
to emergencies and disasters. These challenges will
combine with the need to maintain a robust and ready
military force capable of responding to contingency
requirements anywhere in the world. The National
Guard will remain a key element of the United States’
strategic and operational defense posture, but will
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also be imperative for domestic security and response
requirements as they arise. As such, we need to determine the best overall utility for the National Guard
and direct it toward the appropriate mission capabilities. Affinity to the mission—whether CS or warfighting—should be the primary focus for the future direction of the National Guard. Orienting, training, and
equipping the National Guard to meet the anticipated
requirements is necessary to ensure maximum force
and resource utilization and allocation, which will ultimately contribute to the continued safety and security of the United States.
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